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william m. ramsey, Representation Reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007, 268 pp., £54.00 (hardback). isbn 978-0-521-85987-5.
William Ramsey’s Representation Reconsidered is a superb insightful analysis of the notion
of mental representation in cognitive science.e book presents an original argument
for a bold conclusion: partial eliminativism about mental representation in scientic
psychology. According to Ramsey, once we examine the conditions that need to be
satised for something to qualify as a representation, we can see those conditions are
not fullled by the ‘representations’ posited by much of modern psychology. Cognitive
science—or at least large swathes of it—has no warrant for positing representations.
e structure of Ramsey’s argument repeats a familiar eliminativist strategy (Churchland
1981; Mallon et al. 2009; Stich 1983). First step: argue that in order for something to be
an X, it must satisfy a certain description D (say, beliefs must satisfy the description
given in folk psychology). Second step: argue that to the best of our knowledge, nothing
satises description D (e.g. folk psychology is false). ird step: conclude that since
nothing satises description D, there are no Xs (no beliefs). Here is how the strategy
is played out in the book. First, Ramsey argues for certain minimal conditions that a
representation must satisfy (what he calls the ‘job description’). Second (this takes the
bulk of the book), he considers the ways in which our best psychological theories use the
notion of representation. Ramsey argues that none of these uses satisfy the job description
associated with representation. (A wrinkle is that some representations—those posited by
the classical computational theory of cognition—do qualify as genuine representations.
But, Ramsey claims, classical theories are in a minority in cognitive science, and their
hold on the eld is shrinking.)erefore, Ramsey concludes, at least in most of cognitive
science, there are no mental representations.
at much is the negative component of Ramsey’s argument.e positive component
is that the internal states and mechanisms currently labelled ‘representations’ can be
re-glossed as causal relays or dispositions. Replacing representations with relays or dis-
positions will, according to Ramsey, have little impact on the practice of cognitive science.
1
Empirical cognitive science can continue in roughly the same way minus talk of repres-
entational states. In a nutshell, Ramsey’s claim is that representation talk adds nothing of
explanatory value to (most of) our psychological theories, and is therefore unwarranted.
Mental representations are wheels that do not turn anything in psychological explanations.
Let us consider each step of Ramsey’s argument.
First, step one: the job description challenge.is involves coming up with a description
(D above) of the essential or core features of representation, which we can use in assessing
whether scientic theories that appear to posit representations really do or not. Ramsey
highlights two conditions for something to be a mental representation: non-derived
intentionality and causality. For a state to be a mental representation it must: (i) be capable
of having original intentional content, and (ii) interact causally with other cognitive states.
To these conditions, Ramsey adds a third (and this does most of the work for him). He
claims that (i) and (ii) need to be somehow linked: the causal role that a representation
plays should be determined by its intentional content. For something to be a representation
it must function as such: its intentional content should be relevant to either how the system
works, or our best explanation of how the system works. If the intentional content is just
along for the ride, and does no causal or explanatory work, then there seems no reason to
assume that the state in question is specically representational, rather than, say, a causal
relay with the same eects.
Second, step two: arguing that candidate uses of ‘representation’ in cognitive science
do not meet the job description. First, Ramsey focuses on the exception: the classical
computational theory of the cognition (CCTC). According to Ramsey, CCTC is unique in
cognitive science in that it is committed to representations. CCTC’s commitment arises
in two ways, which Ramsey calls IO-representations and S-representations.is labelling
is somewhat confusing, since the names designate dierent ways in which the CCTC is
committed to representations, not dierent types or theories of representation. It is an
open question whether a single type of representation satises both roles.
First, commitment via the IO-representation-role. Ramsey is not an eliminativist about
non-mental representation and he observes that part of what cognitive agents do is trans-
form non-mental representations (e.g. heard linguistic input into spoken linguistic output).
Representations are therefore needed as the gross inputs and outputs of cognitive agents.
Cognitive science aims to explain how this transformation works. CCTC discharges this
obligation by positing computations, which by their nature take representations as input
and yield representations as output. Computations are also, by their nature, composi-
tional: they are made up from parts, steps, which are oen computations in their own
right.ese mini-computations require their own representations as inputs and outputs.
erefore, CCTC is committed, not just to representations as the gross inputs and outputs
of a cognitive agent, but also to internal representations.
Second, commitment via the S-representation-role. Ramsey’s idea is that CCTC theories
oen explain by attributing models of the world to the agent. ese models tend to
encode structural features of the world (e.g. spatial relations between objects) by their
own structure. By reasoning about the structure of the internal model, cognitive agents
can make inferences about the structure of the world. Ramsey argues that we can only
understand the success of these agents—how these agents manage to make successful
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inferences about the world—if we understand the elements of their models as representing
features of the world. Otherwise, it would be mysterious why examining facts about
the structure of their internal models would allow agents to succeed. Hence, CCTC is
committed to positing internal representations.
What detracts fromRamsey’s argument is that he goes on to infer a less plausible conclusion
about how the content of CCTC representations gets xed, which is conated with the
above claim about commitment. Ramsey claims that an internal model has its content
in virtue of an isomorphism between its structure and the structure of the intended
target system. ere are two points to make about this. First, it is not clear how it
helps Ramsey’s argument, it confuses a representational commitment (viz. explanation
of inference requires internal models) with a positive proposal for a theory of content.
Second, isomorphism-based theories of content face fearsome objections: isomorphism is
a symmetrical relation, but representation is not; isomorphism is too weak a condition for
representation, it entails massive indeterminacy in content (e.g. there is an isomorphism
between the structure of letters inmy car registration and the structure of letters ofmy dog’s
name, but they do not represent each other; isomorphism is also too strong a condition
for representation, a representation need not be isomorphic to what it represents (e.g. a
crude map of the UK can represent the UK, even if it entirely fails to be isomorphic to the
UK). Ramsey considers some of these objections, but he does not succeed in defanging
them. Moreover, it is unclear why he needs to take on the task of defending this, or indeed
any, theory of content. It is not clear how the observation that CCTC posits structured
models that function as surrogates for the world in reasoning entails, or indeed lends any
support, to the conclusion that the representation relation obtains because of this structural
similarity. Just because I use a model that shares structure with what it represents, that
does not mean that the model represents because of its shared structure. Cognitive agents
may infer by examining the structure of mental models that function as surrogates for the
world, but the question of how those models get their particular representational content
is entirely separate (it may be causal, historical, etc.).
We will return this point shortly, but let us focus on the eliminativist part of Ramsey’s
argument. Ramsey moves from the CCTC to cognitive neuroscience and connectionism.
Both theories employ what he calls the receptor notion of representation: X represents Y
if the occurrence of X is reliably caused by, or is nomically dependent on, the occurrence
of Y . At least on the face of it, the receptor notion is not particularly representational:
nomic dependence between two conditions is common, but we are rarely tempted to
attribute representations (think, thunder and lightning). Ramsey introduces Dretske
(1988)’s account, which tries to capture whatmakes some nomic dependencies distinctively
representational. On Dretske’s view, a state X in a system represents Y if (i) X stands in
the appropriate nomic dependency relation to Y , and (ii) X became incorporated into the
system’s processing because of that dependency, in other words, X serves the function of
selectively responding to Y .
Ramsey claims that even with Dretske’s appeal to function, the receptor notion is still
too weak. A ring pin in a gun reliably mediates between the pulling of the trigger and
the discharge of the round.e ring pin is built into the gun for precisely this reason.
Yet we would not say that the ring pin thereby qualies as a representation. Similarly,
a spark plug mediates between an accelerator pedal and a drive sha, but we would
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not say that the spark plug represents the accelerator pedal. Talk of representation in
these cases is overblown: it does not add explanatory value to saying merely that the
state is a reliable causal relay. Ramsey’s objection to the receptor notion is that violates
his third condition in the job description of a representation: representational content
should do some explanatory work. e problem with the receptor notion is that the
nomic dependency relations do all the explanatory work.e content does not have an
explanatory role over and above the eects involved in the nomic correlation.is goes
for ring pins and spark plugs and just as much for ‘edge detector’ cells in the V1 cortex.
Perhaps content has an explanatory role because, on Dretske’s view, the content simply
is or is determined by the nomic correlation? No, as the ring pin and spark plug cases
show, nomic correlation is not sucient for representational content, and so cannot be
it or determine it. Ramsey concludes that employment of the receptor notion should be
understood as involving a commitment to no more than the non-representational causal
relations picked out by the nomic dependency relation. We should be eliminativist about
talk of representation in cognitive neuroscience, connectionist modelling, or any theory
that relies on the receptor notion.
at, in abbreviated form, is Ramsey’s argument. How successful is it?
On the positive side, I think that Ramsey presents a powerful challenge to naturalistic
theories of representation. He shows that a state can satisfy Dretske’s conditions without
being a representation. On the negative side, I do not see how Ramsey’s eliminativist
argument succeeds. e problem stems from Ramsey’s own exception, the CCTC. As
observed above, Ramsey assumes (i) the S-representation-role is the sole property of the
CCTC, and (ii) only an isomorphism-based account of content fullls that role. Both
assumptions appear to be wrong, and this causes trouble for Ramsey’s eliminativism.
First, the commitment to representation engendered by the S-representation-role is not
unique to the CCTC. To recap, the S-representation-role is that cognitive agents make
inferences about the world by reasoning about internal models, and we best explain
the success of those agents if we assume that those internal models represent the world.
But it is hard to see anything distinctively CCTC about this explanatory move. It is
commonplace in cognitive neuroscience, connectionism, indeed, all areas of cognitive
science, to explain behavioural success in terms of the agent’s inferences about internal
models. Dierent theories posit dierent models, but they alike apply the strategy of
explaining worldly success in terms of the agent’s inferences about those models. For
example, in order to explain the success of an agent in making inferences about edges in
her visual eld, one typically assumes that elements in her internal model (e.g. the activity
in her V1 cells) represent distal edges.is explains why the agent’s inferences about that
activity contribute to her worldly success. It is hard to see why Ramsey thinks CCTC is
exceptional; if CCTC has the S-representation-role commitment, then so do these other
theories.
Ramsey’s second assumption also causes trouble. As noted above, how our mental models
get their content need not be answered by an isomorphism-based theory. Ramsey himself
is explicit that he does not challenge the receptor notion as a theory of content, only as a
theory of what makes something a representation.is leaves open that what satises
the receptor notion, by itself, may not fulll the job description of a representation, but
the wider explanatory role that it plays in explaining successful behaviour may justify its
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labelling as a representation rather than a causal relay. Consequently, as far as Ramsey’s
argument goes, connectionist models and cognitive neuroscience may be right to label
internal states that satisfy the receptor notion representations, provided such a labelling
does explanatory work in that it explains the success of the agent in reasoning about
the world—which like CCTC models, it generally appears to do. So the receptor notion
can gain Ramsey’s truly representational credentials via its wider explanatory role in
explaining the success of the agent, just as his isomorphism-based representations do.
e mistake, which strangely enough is one that Ramsey repeatedly points out, is to think
that the receptor notion, by itself, provides a reductive theory of representation, whereas it
only provides one component, a theory of content.
Ramsey argues that what is special about isomorphism-based representations is that they
stand in for something, they are surrogates for reasoning. But it is far from clear why a
receptor based notion cannot fulll the role of a surrogate too. And the receptors posited
in cognitive neuroscience typically do: a face detector or edge detector are understood,
not just as detectors in isolation, but as part of our wider model of the world, and their
activity is considered an apt surrogate for the presence of distal faces or edges in reasoning.
Again, the point is that the distinctive S-representation-role that Ramsey claims is unique
to the CCTC and uniquely lled by an isomorphism-based theory of content is not unique
to classical architectures and can be lled by other theories of content (causal, historical,
etc.).
is just scratches the surface of Ramsey’s excellent book. Whether the partial eliminativ-
ism succeeds or not, the overriding virtue of his book is that it frames, and attempts to
answer, important questions: What is the job description of a representation? Which of
our psychological theories posit entities that fulll that description?ese questions have
not received sucient attention in a literature dominated by the search for theories of
content. In his job description challenge, Ramsey makes clear how a theory of content is
a distinct project from a theory of representation. I would warmly recommend Ramsey’s
book to anyone working on representation.
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